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Alexander Kreitmair5 min read

Backups against ransomware: why a single copy is not enough

A backup only protects against ransomware if attackers cannot delete it. How SMEs can check access, separation and restore.

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Backups against ransomware: why a single copy is not enough

The short answer: a copy on the NAS or an external drive is not yet protection against ransomware. What matters is whether an attacker with administrator rights can reach and delete the backup, and whether a restore has ever been tested. The three-copies rule is a good start. The five questions about your backups help you judge quickly how resilient your setup really is.

Why a simple backup often falls short against ransomware

A backup is often considered done as soon as the nightly job reports green. With ransomware, that is not enough. Someone who has gained a foothold in the network moves around with stolen privileges and looks for anything that can be encrypted or deleted. That includes backups, if they are reachable from the same network and with the same administrator access.

Three typical weak spots:

  • The backup sits in the same network and can be opened with the same credentials as the production system.
  • There is only one location. Fire, water damage or theft hit the original and the copy at the same time.
  • The restore has never been tested. The job runs, but nobody knows how long a rebuild takes or whether the data is complete.

What the BSI says about backups

In February 2022 the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) published its Ransomware Measures Catalogue, in German. It is a working document for companies and authorities that have not yet dealt with the topic, or only in part. It has a dedicated chapter on backups and asks, among other things, whether there are backups that are not connected to the network. The BSI also stresses that no single measure protects on its own, but that several measures work together.

Anyone building a backup concept will find the module CON.3 Datensicherungskonzept (data backup concept) in the BSI IT-Grundschutz. There are implementation notes for this module that describe how to meet its requirements, also in German.

Our assessment: the direction is clear. A backup has to be built so that it survives an attack on the production environment.

The three-copies rule and its limits

A widely used rule of thumb is the 3-2-1 principle: three copies of the data, on two different media, one of them at a different location. The rule makes sense, but it says nothing about who can reach the copies. The table shows what else matters.

QuestionWeak setupResilient setup
Who can reach the backup?The same administrator access as on the production systemSeparate credentials, the protected system may write data but not delete it
What happens on a delete attempt?The backup can be overwritten or deletedAt least one copy is immutable for a fixed period or physically separated
Where is the copy?Same room, same networkDifferent location, ideally a different provider or account
Who can read the data?Plain text on the backup mediumEncrypted, the key is stored separately from the protected system
Has the restore been tested?No, the job only reports successRegular restore test with a record

A backup that the attacker can delete with the same credentials is just a second copy exposed to the same risk.

Our recommendation: five questions about your backups

  1. Who can reach the backup with which credentials, and are they the same as in the production system?
  2. Is there at least one copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a fixed period?
  3. Is at least one copy stored at a different location than the original?
  4. Are the backups encrypted, and is the key not stored only on the protected system?
  5. When was a system last really restored from backup, and how long did it take?

If you cannot answer three or more of these questions with confidence, you have a good starting point. On our page about Linux servers we describe that we set up servers with automatic backups following the 3-2-1 principle, tested regularly. If you want your current setup reviewed, our IT consulting offers a security check that looks for weaknesses in code and infrastructure.

The restore test: the part that often goes missing

A green job status only proves that something was copied. Whether a working operation can be rebuilt from it only the test shows. Our recommendation: test the restore regularly and measure the time. How often depends on how critical a system is and how often it changes, and every company has to decide that for itself. Fixed dates and a written record matter. The result is your real recovery time, and it often differs from the assumption. The credentials for the backup and the key for decryption should also be stored somewhere reachable in an emergency, not only on the server that has just failed.

What a backup does not solve

  • Data exfiltration. In its measures catalogue the BSI points out that ransomware attacks often involve data theft in addition to encryption. No backup helps against stolen data.
  • The break-in itself. Restoring a system from backup without closing the cause risks the next incident. Updates and a secured remote access are part of it, more in our article on VPN gateways.
  • Missing ownership. A backup nobody is responsible for goes stale unnoticed. Someone has to read alerts, trigger tests and carry changes to the system into the concept.
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Frequently asked questions

  • Not on its own. A NAS in the same network with the same credentials can also be encrypted or deleted in an attack. It makes sense as a fast local copy, together with another copy at a different location that an attacker cannot change.

  • Regularly, at an interval each company sets for itself: the more critical a system is and the more often it changes, the more often. Fixed dates, a measured recovery time and a written record matter. A green status of the backup job only proves that something was copied, not that operations can be rebuilt from it.

  • Immutable means that stored data can be neither overwritten nor deleted for a defined period, depending on the setting even with administrator rights. This can be achieved with storage that supports a deletion lock or with a physically separated copy. It replaces neither encryption nor a restore test.

Author of this article

AK

Alexander Kreitmair

Co-Founder & Infrastructure

Certified systems integration specialist. Makes sure the systems keep running - servers, networks, deployment pipelines.

This article is for general information only and does not replace individual legal, tax, or business advice. Prices, timelines, and assessments are non-binding estimates provided without guarantee.